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TORTS-A REQUIEM FOR THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY
DOCTRINE-Knapp v. Staqford, 392 So. 2d 196 (Miss. 1980).
On December 31, 1977, at eleven o'clock p.m., a one vehi-
cle auto accident occurred in which James Stanford was the
owner and operator of the automobile. The passenger, Robert
Knapp, sustained serious personal injuries. The accident hap-
pened as the vehicle approached a sweeping left curve. The
vehicle's right wheel left the pavement's right edge and slid
onto the shoulder for approximately three or four seconds.
Without braking, Stanford attempted to bring the vehicle
back onto the hard surfaced road, which was six to eight
inches above the shoulder due to recent road construction.
The right wheels hung on the raised edge and caused the
driver to lose control. The vehicle went into a spin, crossed
the highway, turned over two or three times and came to rest
in a ditch on the left side of the highway.1
While the resulting injuries to Robert Knapp were not
disputed, the parties differed as to the cause of the accident.2
At trial for the recovery of Knapp's personal injuries, Stan-
ford requested and was granted a jury instruction commonly
referred to as the "sudden emergency" instruction.3 The jury
1. Knapp v. Stanford, 392 So. 2d 196 (Miss. 1980).
2. Id. at 197. Stanford testified that he was driving at a reasonable speed when
forced onto the right shoulder as an on-coming vehicle crossed into his lane, thus
creating the emergency circumstances. However, Knapp stated that Stanford's blaz-
er was being driven over 90 miles an hour and no other vehicle was on the roadway
at the time of the accident.
3. Id. The jury instruction for Stanford stated:
The court instructs the jury that under the law when a person is confronted with a
sudden emergency not of his own making and is by reason thereof placed in a posi-
tion of peril to himself without sufficient time in which to determine with certainty
the best thing to do, he is not held to the same accuracy of judgment as is required
of him under ordinary circumstances, and in this case if you believe from a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that James B. Stanford, immediately prior to the accident
in question was driving his vehicle on his right side of the road, at a reasonable rate
of speed and he was suddenly, without warning, confronted with the vehicle driven
by persons unknown within James Stanford's lane of traffic and that the presence
of the other vehicle constituted a sudden emergency which was not of a making of
the defendant, James B. Stanford, and if you further find from a preponderance of
the evidence that after having been confronted with such sudden emergency, if any,
the defendant, James B. Stanford, used the same degree of care that a reasonably
prudent automobile driver would have used under the same or similar circum-
stances, if any, but was unable to avoid the accident giving rise to this lawsuit, then
the defendant, James B. Stanford, was not guilty of negligence which proximately
caused the collision in question, and in that event, it would be your sworn duty to
return a verdict for the defendant, James B. Stanford.
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returned a verdict for Stanford negating liability for any
negligent actions, and Knapp appealed, claiming such in-
struction was error. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed
and held the jury instruction did not apply to the undisputed
facts. The court abolished the doctrine of sudden emergency
in Mississippi and held that the same standards of negligent
conduct should apply in this and similar negligence actions.'
A REVIEW OF THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE
The sudden emergency doctrine' encompasses those ac-
tions an individual takes when faced with a sudden emergen-
cy, created by another, in which due to want of time the ac-
tor responds with the care of a reasonably prudent person
under the circumstances.' The individual's failure to exercise
the best judgment in an emergency often results in injuries
to innocent third parties, but, due to the application of the
doctrine, the actor is not held liable for his negligence.7 The
courts have taken into consideration the actor's need for a
speedy decision and the lack of safe alternative courses of
action as opposed to the foresight and calm judgment avail-
able in normal circumstances Emergencies are only one of
the situations requiring a reasonable standard of care by the
normally prudent and careful person? Thus, in a sudden
emergency, the law does not require a higher standard of
4. 392 So. 2d at 199.
5. The sudden emergency doctrine is also known as the doctrine of imminent
peril, Goolsbee v. Texas & N.O.R., 150 Tex. 528, 531, 243 S.W.2d 386, 387 (1951); sud-
den peril, Spence v. Doran, 306 P.2d 499, 503 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); terror, Gra-
ham v. Hines, 240 S.W. 1015, 1020 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1922); emergency, Ja-
cobsen v. Cummings, 318 Ill. App. 464, 469, 48 N.E.2d 603, 609 (1943).
6. 57 AM. Jun. 2d Negligence § 590 (1971); Majure v. Herrington, 243 Miss. 692,
699, 139 So. 2d 635, 638 (1962); Mississippi Cent. R.R. v. Aultman, 173 Miss. 622, 642,
160 So. 737, 740 (1935).
7. Peel v. Gulf Transp. Co., 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377 (1965). Judge Cardozo
stated in Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 182, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921):
"Errors of judgment, however, would not count against him, if they resulted from
the excitement and confusion of the moment."
8. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 296 (1965) clarifies the emergency fac-
tor under these circumstances "In determining whether conduct is negligent toward
another, the fact that the actor is confronted with a sudden emergency which re-
quires rapid decision is a factor in determining the reasonable character of his
choice of action."
9. I& § 470;, See Jones v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 211 Miss. 34, 50 So. 2d 902
(1959).
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care than that which is reasonable under the circumstances.10
A similar but distinguishable theory of tort law is that
of the unavoidable or inevitable accident." This alternative
attempt to negate liability is defined as an unintended occur-
rence which could not have been prevented by the exercise of
due care by both parties, and was not caused by the fault of
any person. 2 Like the sudden emergency doctrine, an un-
avoidable accident exonerates one from liability in that the
actor claims his negligence was not the proximate cause of
the injury. However, the difference lies in the fact situation
itself. In an unavoidable accident, any choice of action taken
by the defendant would result in an accident, thus the term
unavoidable accident. In a sudden emergency situation, the
defendant has a choice of actions, one of which might not
have resulted in an accident. The defendant is not held liable
in an unavoidable accident because he is only required to act
in a reasonable manner under the stress of the circum-
stances. While these are not foreseeable, they are often
linked with the superior forces of nature and have become
synonymous with an "act of God."1"
The doctrine of sudden emergency first emerged in Eng-
land in 1773 in the infamous "squib case" of Scott v. Shep-
10. Jones v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 211 Miss. 34, 50 So. 2d 902 (1959).
11. W. PROSSER, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 29 (4th ed. 1971); 57 AM. JUIL 2d
Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 16 (1971).
12. Otto v. Selinow, 233 Minn. 215, 225, 46 N.W.2d 641, 646 (1951).
13. Compare Neal v. Saunderson, 6 Miss. (2 S. & M.) 572, 577 (1844) with City of
Jackson v. Brummett, 244 Miss. 501, 80 So. 2d 827 (1955).
There is a further distinction between the theories of "act of God" and "un-
avoidable accident." The former denotes natural accidents such as violent storms,
lightning, and floods, while the latter denotes events involving a human agency
which are unforeseeable and no amount of protection could ever prevent. See City of
Jackson v. Brummett, 224 Miss. 501, 80 So. 2d 827 (1955).
Like a sudden emergency, the unavoidable accident doctrine enjoys a separate
jury instruction which may be presented to the jury to demonstrate further that the
defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of a third party's injuries. THE
Mississippi MODEL JuRY INsTRUcTIONS, Negligence § 36.08 (1977) states:
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this cause that
plaintiff's injury was due directly and exclusively to natural causes
without human intervention and which could not have been prevented
by the exercise of reasonable care and foresight, the occurrence is an
act of God for which the defendant is not liable.
However, the pleadings and elements, to establish each circumstance, must be
specially pled and submitted into evidence to enable the court to render the proper
jury instruction.
1981]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
ard&" In 1816, the doctrine was further developed in Jones v.
Boyce" in which Chief Justice Lord Ellenborough wrote that
one must be responsible for the consequences if one forces
another to adopt a perilous alternative." The Jones decision
was approved and followed by the United States Supreme
Court in Stokes v. Saltonstall7 in 1839. Since then Stokes and
Jones have formed the theoretical cornerstones for the mod-
ern sudden emergency doctrine.
Mississippi adopted the emergency doctrine in 1933 in
Vann v. Tankersly.'s The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed
a lower court decision and held that the elderly Vann was
not liable when he acted to save his wife from falling from
their moving car, whereupon he lost control and injured Tan-
kersly, an innocent pedestrian seated upon a sidewalk
bench. 9 Since 1933, various situations have prompted re-
quests for a sudden emergency instruction in order to negate
liability.20
14. 2 Win. BI. 892, 3 Wils. 403, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 [1553-1774], All E.R. Rep. 295
(K.B. 1773). A lighted squib (firecracker) was thrown into a crowded market and
then thrown from stall to stall as merchants sought to save their goods. The squib
hit the plaintiff in the eye, exploded, causing permanent vision loss. The plaintiff
sued the intervening squib hurlers. Justice Gould, in a concurring opinion, stated
that terror deprived the merchants of the power of recollection and they acted in
excited self-defense and thus were not liable. Id.
15. 1 Stark. 493, 171 Eng. Rep. 540 [1814-23], All E.R. Rep. 570 (N.P. 1819). The
plaintiff, believing defendant's coach was about to tip over, jumped out, thus sus-
taining a broken leg. The coach remained upright but the defendant was held negli-
gent. Id.
16. Id.
17. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 181 (1839). Plaintiff and his wife jumped from a moving
coach as it turned over and plaintiff pled that they were free of any contributory
negligence due to the emergency situation and the Supreme Court affirmed the low-
er court's award of $7,130. Id.
18. 164 Miss. 748, 145 So. 642 (1933).
For a thorough review of the history of the doctrine of sudden emergency, See
Gillespie, The Sudden Emergency Doctrine, 36 Miss. L.J. 392 (1965).
19. 164 Miss. at 752, 145 So. at 643.
20. These situations include: Wood v. Walley, 352 So. 2d 1083 (Miss. 1977) (vehi-
cle illegally entering intersection); Nielson v. Miller, 259 So. 2d 702 (Miss. 1972)
(brakes failed); Graves v. Hart's Baker, Inc., 241 So. 2d 673 (1970) (vehicle unexpect-
edly pulling out into traffic); Bozeman v. Tucker, 203 So. 2d 795 (Miss. 1967) (cows in
the road); Peel v. Gulf Transp. Co., 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377 (1965) (vehicle
swerving into a passing bus); Layton v. Cook, 248 Miss. 690, 160 So. 2d 685 (1964)
(driver blinded by on-coming car lights); Gregory v. Thompson, 248 Miss. 431, 160
So. 2d 195 (1964) (slow moving vehicle); Cipriani v. Miller, 248 Miss. 670, 160 So. 2d
87 (1964) (disabled car on the side of the road); Crump v. Brown, 246 Miss. 671, 151
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Despite the court's frequent criticism of attorneys for
failing to incorporate the necessary elements in jury instruc-
tions in order to justify a proper sudden emergency instruc-
tion,21 the doctrine has been successfully used on behalf of
innocent litigants.2 Juries are not required to find for the
party seeking the sudden emergency instruction if such an
instruction is given, but may take the emergency into consid-
eration as one of the unusual circumstances arising which re-
quired the party to take instantaneous action. 2 Though often
mistaken as an absolute defense or a tool of avoidance,2' sud-
den emergency is only one of the circumstances to be consid-
ered in determining if a litigant used reasonable care.25
In recent years, both plaintiff 6 and defense27 attorneys
familiar with elements of the doctrine have used it as an ef-
fective trial tactic. However, attorneys and trial judges have
consistently misinterpreted and failed to follow the rules
So. 2d 822 (1963) (pedestrian in the road); Moak v. Black, 230 Miss. 337, 92 So. 2d 845
(1957) (child on bicycle turning into traffic); Callaway v. Haddad, 226 Miss. 177, 83
So. 2d 825 (1955) (driver caught his pants cuff on the seat lever and was unable to
brake); Mississippi Cent. R.R. v. Aultman, 173 Miss. 622, 160 So. 737 (1935) (bus upon
railroad tracks).
21. Justice Brady in Bozeman v. Tucker, 203 So. 2d 795, 797 (Miss. 1967) stated.
"We have, with metronomic regularity, undertaken our Sisyphean task of imparting
to the Bar the three essentials which must be present in an instruction concerning a
sudden emergency and which must factually exist to justify the granting of a sud-
den emergency instruction."
See, e.g., Continental So. Lines, Inc. v. Lurn, 182 So. 2d 228 (Miss. 1966); McClure
v. Felts, 252 Miss. 234, 172 So. 2d 549 (1965); Kettle v. Musser's Potato Chips, Inc.,
249 Miss. 212, 162 So. 2d 243 (1964).
22. See, eg., Graves v. Hart's Bakery, Inc., 241 So. 2d 673 (Miss. 1970); Lum v.
Jackson Indus. Uniform Serv., Inc., 253 Miss. 342, 175 So. 2d 501 (1965); Rushing v.
Edwards, 244 Miss. 677, 145 So. 2d 695 (1962); Majure v. Herrington, 243 Miss. 692,
139 So. 2d 635 (1962); Phillips v. Delta Motor Lines, 235 Miss. 1, 108 So. 2d 409 (1959);
Vann v. Tankersly, 164 Miss. 748, 145 So. 642 (1933).
The "doctrine" has been severely criticized when successfully used by a defen-
dant in a negligence suit, as a legal device whereby the injured party is left without
compensatory relief.
23. Dreyfuss v. Mississippi City Lines, 261 So. 2d 786, 789-90 (Miss. 1972).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Jones v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 211 Miss. 34, 50 So. 2d 902
(1951); Mississippi Cent. R.R. v. Aultman, 173 Miss. 622, 160 So. 737 (1935); Jones v.
Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 266 Or. 513, 511 P.2d 347 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 296 (1965).
See Reynolds, Put Yourseff in an Emergency-How Will You Be Judged?, 62 Ky.
L.J. 366, 369 (1974); Wise, The Sudden Emergency Doctrine As Applied In South
Carolina, 20 S.CI. REV. 408, 414 (1968).
26. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Withers, 247 Miss. 123, 154 So. 2d 157 (1963).
27. Wood v. Walley, 352 So. 2d 1083 (Miss. 1977).
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promulgated by the Mississippi Supreme Court.2" This failure
has ultimately led to the abolition of the doctrine itself.
In Gu, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Wither's, 29 the court estab-
lished three essential elements to invoke a proper jury sud-
den emergency instruction: (1) The individual must have used
reasonable care before the emergency and the emergency was
not of his own making;" (2) a description of the emergency
which would warrant the jury to find a sudden emergency
existed;3 ' and (3) after the emergency arose, he exercised the
care of a reasonably prudent person under these unusual cir-
cumstances.32 In 1966, the court attempted to define further
the situations which would warrant a sudden emergency in-
struction in order to direct the Bar away from embarrassing
28. Justice Bowling writing for the majority in Knapp, 392 So. 2d at 198 stated-
Over the years we have cautioned trial attorneys in a large number
of cases regarding the danger of requesting and securing the so-called
"sudden emergency" instruction. During the past twenty-five years,
this Court has considered approximately twenty-seven cases on appeal
involving the propriety of the instruction either in its language or ap-
plicability andout of those cases approximately twenty have been re-
versed because the instruction was erroneous in some manner.
29. 247 Miss. 123, 154 So. 2d 157 (1963).
30. In sixteen instances the Mississippi Supreme Court has reversed the case
where this element was omitted or improperly applied Nielson v. Miller, 259 So. 2d
702 (Miss. 1972); Mercier v. Davis, 234 So. 2d 902 (Miss. 1970); May v. Pace, 197 So. 2d
220 (Miss. 1967); Washington v. Terrel, 185 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1966); Peel v. Gulf
Transp. Co., 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377 (1965); McClure v. Felts, 252 Miss. 234, 172
So. 2d 549 (1965); Ladner v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 251 Miss. 804, 171 So. 2d
503 (1965); Gregory v. Thompson, 248 Miss. 431, 160 So. 2d 195 (1964); Cipriani v.
Miller, 248 Miss. 672, 160 So. 2d 87 (1964); Crump v. Brown, 246 Miss. 631,151 So. 2d
822 (1963); Pullin v. Nabors, 240 Miss. 864, 128 So. 2d 117 (1961); Meeks v. McBeath,
231 Miss. 504, 95 So. 2d 791 (1957); Moak v. Black, 230 Miss. 337, 92 So. 2d 845 (1957);
Rivers v. Turner, 223 Miss. 673, 78 So. 2d 903 (1955); Continental S. Lines, Inc. v.
Klass, 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 575 (1953); Jones v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc. 211
Miss. 34, 50 So. 2d 902 (1951).
31. Six cases have been reversed in whole or in part due to this error in instruc-
tions: Dreyfuss v. Mississippi City Lines, 261 So. 2d 786 (Miss. 1972); Bozeman v.
Tucker, 203 So. 2d 795 (Miss. 1967); Continental S. Lines, Inc. v. Lum, 254 Miss. 655,
182 So. 2d 228 (1966); McClure v. Felt, 252 Miss. 234, 172 So. 2d 549 (1965); Kettle v.
Musser's Potato Chips, 249 Miss. 212, 162 So. 2d 243 (1964); Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R.
v. Withers, 247 Miss. 123, 154 So. 2d 157 (1963).
32. Five cases were reversed in whole or in part due to an error on element #3:
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Withers, 247 Miss. 123, 154 So. 2d 157 (1963); Summers v.
Johnson, 236 Miss. 826, 105 So. 2d 451 (1958); Moore v. Taggart, 233 Miss. 389,102 So.
2d 333 (1958); Calloway v. Haddad, 226 Miss. 177, 83 So. 2d 825 (1955); Jones v. Dixie
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 211 Miss. 34, 50 So. 2d 902 (1951). See Continental S. Lines,
Inc. v. Lum, 254 Miss. 655, 182 So. 2d 228 (1966); McClure v. Felts, 252 Miss. 234,172
So. 2d 549 (1965); Kettle v. Musser's Potato Chips, Inc., 249 Miss. 212, 162 So. 2d 243
(1964).
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reversals.3 Justice Sugg, in limiting sudden emergency
instructions, set the following guidelines:
1) The motorist seeking the instruction must be driving in a reason-
able and prudent manner;
2) the driver must be suddenly confronted with an unexpected and
sudden emergency;
3) the emergency cannot be created or contributed to by the negli-
gence or the wrongful conduct of the driver claiming the benefit
of the rule;
4) the driver must be placed in a position of peril to himself;
5) the driver cannot have sufficient time in which to determine by
rational deliberation the best alternative;
6) and, the degree of care to be weighed by the jury under the said
emergency doctrine is that which a reasonably prudent and capa-
ble driver would use under the "unusual" circumstances brought
about by the sudden emergency."
Though in 1965 there was no noticeable trend toward the
abolishment of the sudden emergency doctrine,35 this is no
longer true today. 6 As recently as 1979, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court in Gates Rubber Co. v. Dukes7 stated that the
sudden emergency instructions are "doubtful when requested
and dangerous to a party's case when given."38 However, in
1970, the Supreme Court of Oregon was one of the first
courts to criticize openly the usefulness of the doctrine. 9 The
33. Wood v. Walley, 352 So. 2d at 1086-87.
34. 1&
35. Gillespie, The Sudden Emergency Doctrine, 36 Miss. L.J. 392, 408 (1965).
36. In Florida, the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions,
appointed in 1962 by the Florida Supreme Court, recommended "that sudden emer-
gency instructions not be given to juries in Florida." The author points out that this
is not a rejection of the sudden emergency doctrine, but rather that the doctrine "is
adequately applied to the facts by the general charge on negligence." Hollingsworth,
The Sudden Emergency Doctrine in Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 667, 680 (1969).
See also, THE ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION, § 12.02-.03 (1961), which recom-
mends against the giving of sudden emergency jury instructions.
37. 367 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 1979). Though the emergency doctrine has seen its
greatest use in automobile cases, Gates recently expanded the doctrine of sudden
emergency into the field on products liability. In 1979, suit was brought against a
hose manufacturer for the negligent production of a hose which ruptured while a
farm supply manager, Mr. William Duke, was transferring deadly anhydrous ammo-
nia into a customer's tank. After the hose ruptured, Duke attempted to close a sup-
ply valve after donning a gas mask. He became ill and subsequently died after clos-
ing the valve. His executrix brought suit based upon the sudden emergency rule and
products liability warranties, but the case was ultimately reversed due to the de-
ceased manager's negligence in falling to change the hose once it developed a dan-
gerous bend.
38. Id. at 912.
39. Evans v. General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc., 257 Or. 460, 479 P.2d 747
(1970).
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Oregon court stated that it would be a rare situation where it
would be error to fail to give the sudden emergency instruc-
tion. 0 They, like the Mississippi Supreme Court in Knapp,
reasoned that the standard negligence instruction includes
how a reasonable man would act under the same circum-
stances, including those of sudden emergency." Two months
later, the Oregon court, in separate decisions, labeled the
doctrine "treacherous" 2 and again stated that a sudden
emergency instruction was "unnecessary to give and should
be avoided.4 3 The present status of the doctrine in Oregon
and other jurisdictions4' is that the sudden emergency doc-
trine is to be avoided and rarely would any failure to give it
on behalf of a litigant constitute reversible error. 5
INSTANT CASE ANALYSIS
The Mississippi Supreme Court's decision to abolish the
sudden emergency doctrine effectively unified the standards
by which negligence actions are judged.4 In the past, Missis-
sippi courts have consistently lowered the liability standards
for negligent conduct in emergencies and raised the standard
of reasonable care under normal circumstances .4 These twin
standards of liability have often misled juries as to the spe-
40. Id. at 464, 479 P.2d at 750-51.
41. 257 Or. 460, 479 P.2d 747 (1970).
THE MississiPpi MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Negligence § 36.01 (1977) has an iden-
tical section: "Reasonable care is that degree of care which a reasonably careful
person would use under like or similar circumstance." (emphasis added). Section
36.11 Sudden Emergency Instruction also states: 'JA]fter the sudden emergency
arose... defendant exercised the care of a reasonable prudent person under like or
similar circumstane." (emphasis added).
42. Rankin v. White, 258 Or. 252, 256, 482 P.2d 530, 533 (1971).
43. Ballard v. Rickabaugh Orchards, Inc., 259 Or. 200, 207, 485 P.2d 1080, 1083
(1971). See Galvert v. Ourum, 40 Or. App. 511, 595 P.2d 1264 (1979); Swanson v. Hale,
273 Or. 138, 539 P.2d 1073 (1975); Harkins v. Doyle, 271 Or. 664, 533 P.2d 785 (1975).
Jones v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 266 Or. 513, 511 P.2d 347 (1973); Evans v. Gener-
al Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc., 257 Or. 460, 479 P.2d 747 (1970).
44. Hollingsworth, The Sudden Emergency Doctrine in Florida, 21 U. FLA. L.
REv. 667, 681 (1969); Thode, Imminent Peril and Emergency in Texas, 40 TEx. L. REV.
441 (1962); Wiehl, Instructing a Jury, 36 WASH. L. REv. 378, 383 (1961).
45. Jones v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 266 Or. 513, 526, 511 P.2d 347, 353 (1973).
46. 392 So. 2d at 198.
47. Id. Justice Bowling stated in the majority opinion: "The hazard of relying on
the doctrine of sudden emergency is the tendency to elevate its principles above
what is required to be proven in a negligence action."
[Vol. 2:305
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cific amount of care required in emergency and non-emer-
gency situations. 8
It is doubtful that chaos will erupt throughout our court
system with the striking of the sudden emergency jury in-
struction from the arsenals of skilled defense attorneys," for
now the standard negligence instruction is sufficient to in-
clude all circumstances including those of sudden emergen-
cy.50 However, the court has implied that any mention of the
terms "sudden emergency," when tying the facts to the law
in an instruction, would invoke an automatic reversal.
While abolishing the doctrine in a 5-4 decision,5" the ma-
jority failed to answer Justice Walker's claim that Knapp
presented a classic sudden emergency fact situation and thus
must be affirmed.52 However, the court used Knapp as their
means to scrap the sudden emergency instruction which had
plagued judges, jurors, and attorneys for almost half a cen-
tury. Justice Walker's strong and well-reasoned dissent fo-
cused upon the doctrine's fifty-year tradition, but like the
majority opinion, Walker implied that though the emergency
doctrine was abolished, it still lives within the bounds of the
existing standard."3 Justice Smith's dissenting argument that
the doctrine itself was not under question but rather the nar-
row fact situation had little merit..4 In essence, the majority
48. Lachman v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 160 F.2d 496 (4th Cir. 1947).
49. "To abolish the doctrine now will create chaos out of what is presently a
little confusion. In my opinion, the majority are doing a disservice to the bench, the
bar, and the litigants by abolishing this long-established principle of law." 392 So.
2d 196, 202 (Walker, J., dissenting).
50. Evans v. General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc., 257 Or. 460, 479 P.2d 747
(1971).
At the outset of the majority opinion in Knapp, the court held that the emer-
gency was in fact over and the granting of the sudden emergency instruction was in
error because Stanford was negligent in failing to see what he should have seen and
"that which is in plain view, open and apparent." 392 So. 2d at 198. See, ag., Shideler
v. Taylor, 292 So. 2d 155 (Miss. 1974); Stewart v. White, 220 So. 2d 271 (Miss. 1969);
Tippit v. Hunter, 205 So. 2d 267 (Miss. 1967); Campbell v. Schmidt, 195 So. 2d 87
(Miss. 1967); Layton v. Cook, 248 Miss. 690, 160 So. 2d 685 (1964).
51. Justices Patterson, CJ., Sugg, Brown, Lee, Bowling for the majority and Jus-
tices Smith, Robertson, Walker, Coffer dissenting.
52. 392 So. 2d 196, 202 (Walker, J., dissenting).
53. 392 So. 2d 196, 202 (Walker, J., dissenting).
Justice Walker in his vigorous dissent stated 'TWlhat test is left is the same as
before-what a reasonable prudent man might have done when faced with the same
or similar circumstances, ie, a sudden emergency." Id. at 202.
54. 392 So. 2d 196, 199 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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held that negligence cases would best be disposed of by uni-
form principles of negligence.55
CONCLUSION
The Mississippi Supreme Court's decision to abolish the
sudden emergency doctrine has removed a long-standing
enigma which has existed since its introduction in 1933 in
Vann v. Tankersly.56 The court has stated that the present
test of one charged with negligence is whether his actions
were that of a reasonable and prudent person under the same
or similar circumstances." In doing so, the court has retained
an acceptable solution by instructing that the alleged negli-
gent act be entwined with the evidence presented to verify
the circumstance, ie. an emergency. 8 The court has at last
recognized that sudden emergency is neither a defense, nor a
tool of avoidance,59 but rather one of several circumstances
which should be considered by the jury. The "doctrine" is not
an exception to the standard of care required of a reasonable
man but an application of it.
While the court has quelled the chaos of past decisions
which have attempted to clarify the instruction, it has failed
to instruct members of the Bar on their role in presenting
similar cases of fact before Mississippi juries. However,
while the doctrine lives under the guise of the standard neg-
ligence instruction, plaintiff attorneys will be relieved of the
burden of defending against the doctrine's prejudicial jury
instruction. In the past, these instructions have been compli-
cated and have resulted in a confusion of the basic issues of
negligence and have made the results of litigation even more
unpredictable. A standardization of the instruction will en-
hance the jury's ability to grasp and comprehend the basic
issues of negligence, causation, and damages. At the same
time, defense attorneys would be wise to prove the emergen-
55. Id. at 198. The Mississippi Supreme Court commented that the doctrine of
sudden emergency "tends to confuse the principle of comparative negligence that is
well ingrained in the jurisprudence of this state." Mississippi was the first state to
adopt such a general comparative negligence act, doing so in 1910. See W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 436 (4th ed. 1971).
56. 164 Miss. 748, 145 So. 642 (1933).
57. 392 So. 2d at 199.
58. Id.
59. See Peel v. Gulf Transp. Co., 252 Miss. 797, 815-17, 174 So. 2d 377, 385 (1965).
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cy elements by presenting supporting evidence to solidify the
existence of emergency circumstances within the jury's
mind,"0 and the reasonableness of the actor's conduct in light
thereof.
In summary, Knapp v. Stanford will be viewed as the
court's means of unifying the abolished "doctrine" with the
reasonable standard of care instruction. While many would
view this decision as abolishing an important common sense
rule of law, the result is merely a different name for an old
rule.
Timothy Lee Murr
60. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Withers, 247 Miss. 123, 154 So. 2d 157 (1963)
listed 3 elements which trial attorneys should present in their jury instructions.
However, after Knapp, these elements should be presented as evidence and argued
to the jury to establish that the emergency action was reasonable under the circum-
stances and thus their client should not be held liable:
1) The individual must have used reasonable care before the emergen-
cy and the emergency was not of his own making;,
A description of the emergency which would warrant the jury to
ind a sudden emergency existed; and
3) After the emergency arose he exercised the care of a reasonable
prudent person under these unusual circumstances.
As stated earlier, there should be no mention of the terms "sudden emergency"
in an instruction as it would invoke an automatic reversal.
1981]

